Does collectivism actually exist?Can society exist without hierarchy?How does Pareto solve Parson's utilitarian dilemma?What does Baudrillard mean by “The end of the Social”?Does culture both reflect and create society?Can class, status and power exist independently?Is “class culture” an artificial construct or does it have “natural” motivation?What does ‘Disinterestedness’ mean in the context of Mertonian norms?

How do ground effect vehicles perform turns?

Two-sided logarithm inequality

Difference between -| and |- in TikZ

How to decide convergence of Integrals

What does this horizontal bar at the first measure mean?

Is it possible to have a strip of cold climate in the middle of a planet?

Is there a conventional notation or name for the slip angle?

Why did the HMS Bounty go back to a time when whales are already rare?

When quoting, must I also copy hyphens used to divide words that continue on the next line?

Are lightweight LN wallets vulnerable to transaction withholding?

Could the E-bike drivetrain wear down till needing replacement after 400 km?

Can a significant change in incentives void an employment contract?

List of people who lose a child in תנ"ך

Is possible to search in vim history?

What is the difference between "Do you interest" and "...interested in" something?

Open a doc from terminal, but not by its name

Diode in opposite direction?

Bob has never been a M before

Greco-Roman egalitarianism

How do I repair my stair bannister?

Will the technology I first learn determine the direction of my future career?

What is this type of notehead called?

Proof of Lemma: Every nonzero integer can be written as a product of primes

What major Native American tribes were around Santa Fe during the late 1850s?



Does collectivism actually exist?


Can society exist without hierarchy?How does Pareto solve Parson's utilitarian dilemma?What does Baudrillard mean by “The end of the Social”?Does culture both reflect and create society?Can class, status and power exist independently?Is “class culture” an artificial construct or does it have “natural” motivation?What does ‘Disinterestedness’ mean in the context of Mertonian norms?













3















Does collectivism actually exist?



Wikipedia defines:




Collectivism is a cultural value that is characterized by emphasis on
cohesiveness among individuals and prioritization of the group over
self.




If (at least from western Cartesian viewpoint) the subject is the fundamental cognitive being, then how is it possible that group experience would override subjective experience? It seems supernatural and thus "religious".



Or perhaps it's subjective? I could imagine that for someone e.g. physically weak, it'd make more sense to "group up" with other or stronger members, since you're weak alone.










share|improve this question






















  • it certainly.exists as a concept. And there are all sorts of collectives. If you pay tax, you're in one. Some societies are more disposed to the ideal of collectivism than others. And ultimately humans are neither ant nor tiger, and tire, making the implementation of more ideal economic collectivism (communism say) a task of coping with boredom and desire for choice. But without collectivism in its essence, nothing above that achievable by the power of one person would ever get done.

    – Richard
    yesterday











  • The definition in Wiki is obviously not full. It demands a free parameter. "prioritization of the group over self" .. IN WHAT? A team can behave itself as a team during a football game, but after the game ends, there is no team, but a group of separate people. BTW, the other part of the definition is even worse: "characterized by emphasis on cohesiveness.." - totally senseless part. "Collectivism is a cultural value..." - A value is not CHARACTERIZED, but MEASURED, as by prioritization, for example.

    – Gangnus
    yesterday















3















Does collectivism actually exist?



Wikipedia defines:




Collectivism is a cultural value that is characterized by emphasis on
cohesiveness among individuals and prioritization of the group over
self.




If (at least from western Cartesian viewpoint) the subject is the fundamental cognitive being, then how is it possible that group experience would override subjective experience? It seems supernatural and thus "religious".



Or perhaps it's subjective? I could imagine that for someone e.g. physically weak, it'd make more sense to "group up" with other or stronger members, since you're weak alone.










share|improve this question






















  • it certainly.exists as a concept. And there are all sorts of collectives. If you pay tax, you're in one. Some societies are more disposed to the ideal of collectivism than others. And ultimately humans are neither ant nor tiger, and tire, making the implementation of more ideal economic collectivism (communism say) a task of coping with boredom and desire for choice. But without collectivism in its essence, nothing above that achievable by the power of one person would ever get done.

    – Richard
    yesterday











  • The definition in Wiki is obviously not full. It demands a free parameter. "prioritization of the group over self" .. IN WHAT? A team can behave itself as a team during a football game, but after the game ends, there is no team, but a group of separate people. BTW, the other part of the definition is even worse: "characterized by emphasis on cohesiveness.." - totally senseless part. "Collectivism is a cultural value..." - A value is not CHARACTERIZED, but MEASURED, as by prioritization, for example.

    – Gangnus
    yesterday













3












3








3


1






Does collectivism actually exist?



Wikipedia defines:




Collectivism is a cultural value that is characterized by emphasis on
cohesiveness among individuals and prioritization of the group over
self.




If (at least from western Cartesian viewpoint) the subject is the fundamental cognitive being, then how is it possible that group experience would override subjective experience? It seems supernatural and thus "religious".



Or perhaps it's subjective? I could imagine that for someone e.g. physically weak, it'd make more sense to "group up" with other or stronger members, since you're weak alone.










share|improve this question














Does collectivism actually exist?



Wikipedia defines:




Collectivism is a cultural value that is characterized by emphasis on
cohesiveness among individuals and prioritization of the group over
self.




If (at least from western Cartesian viewpoint) the subject is the fundamental cognitive being, then how is it possible that group experience would override subjective experience? It seems supernatural and thus "religious".



Or perhaps it's subjective? I could imagine that for someone e.g. physically weak, it'd make more sense to "group up" with other or stronger members, since you're weak alone.







sociology






share|improve this question













share|improve this question











share|improve this question




share|improve this question










asked yesterday









mavaviljmavavilj

1,103824




1,103824












  • it certainly.exists as a concept. And there are all sorts of collectives. If you pay tax, you're in one. Some societies are more disposed to the ideal of collectivism than others. And ultimately humans are neither ant nor tiger, and tire, making the implementation of more ideal economic collectivism (communism say) a task of coping with boredom and desire for choice. But without collectivism in its essence, nothing above that achievable by the power of one person would ever get done.

    – Richard
    yesterday











  • The definition in Wiki is obviously not full. It demands a free parameter. "prioritization of the group over self" .. IN WHAT? A team can behave itself as a team during a football game, but after the game ends, there is no team, but a group of separate people. BTW, the other part of the definition is even worse: "characterized by emphasis on cohesiveness.." - totally senseless part. "Collectivism is a cultural value..." - A value is not CHARACTERIZED, but MEASURED, as by prioritization, for example.

    – Gangnus
    yesterday

















  • it certainly.exists as a concept. And there are all sorts of collectives. If you pay tax, you're in one. Some societies are more disposed to the ideal of collectivism than others. And ultimately humans are neither ant nor tiger, and tire, making the implementation of more ideal economic collectivism (communism say) a task of coping with boredom and desire for choice. But without collectivism in its essence, nothing above that achievable by the power of one person would ever get done.

    – Richard
    yesterday











  • The definition in Wiki is obviously not full. It demands a free parameter. "prioritization of the group over self" .. IN WHAT? A team can behave itself as a team during a football game, but after the game ends, there is no team, but a group of separate people. BTW, the other part of the definition is even worse: "characterized by emphasis on cohesiveness.." - totally senseless part. "Collectivism is a cultural value..." - A value is not CHARACTERIZED, but MEASURED, as by prioritization, for example.

    – Gangnus
    yesterday
















it certainly.exists as a concept. And there are all sorts of collectives. If you pay tax, you're in one. Some societies are more disposed to the ideal of collectivism than others. And ultimately humans are neither ant nor tiger, and tire, making the implementation of more ideal economic collectivism (communism say) a task of coping with boredom and desire for choice. But without collectivism in its essence, nothing above that achievable by the power of one person would ever get done.

– Richard
yesterday





it certainly.exists as a concept. And there are all sorts of collectives. If you pay tax, you're in one. Some societies are more disposed to the ideal of collectivism than others. And ultimately humans are neither ant nor tiger, and tire, making the implementation of more ideal economic collectivism (communism say) a task of coping with boredom and desire for choice. But without collectivism in its essence, nothing above that achievable by the power of one person would ever get done.

– Richard
yesterday













The definition in Wiki is obviously not full. It demands a free parameter. "prioritization of the group over self" .. IN WHAT? A team can behave itself as a team during a football game, but after the game ends, there is no team, but a group of separate people. BTW, the other part of the definition is even worse: "characterized by emphasis on cohesiveness.." - totally senseless part. "Collectivism is a cultural value..." - A value is not CHARACTERIZED, but MEASURED, as by prioritization, for example.

– Gangnus
yesterday





The definition in Wiki is obviously not full. It demands a free parameter. "prioritization of the group over self" .. IN WHAT? A team can behave itself as a team during a football game, but after the game ends, there is no team, but a group of separate people. BTW, the other part of the definition is even worse: "characterized by emphasis on cohesiveness.." - totally senseless part. "Collectivism is a cultural value..." - A value is not CHARACTERIZED, but MEASURED, as by prioritization, for example.

– Gangnus
yesterday










1 Answer
1






active

oldest

votes


















4














Remembering the emotions



Descartes never says that we are merely cognitive beings. Thinking may be our essence - may define our essential nature - but we are also creatures of emotion or 'passion' as the term is usually rendered in translation.



In the Passions of the Soul he identifies six primitive passions :




The first primitive passion is [1] wonder, which occurs when an unfamiliar
object is encountered and which "we . . . find novel, or very different from
what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to be . . . ."
Wonder is first and foremost because it occurs before the object has been
determined to be "beneficial"; and it has no opposite, since looking at an
object without wonder is to look at it "without passion."



Descartes in fact defines each of the primitive passions through a differentiation which occurs on the biological level through the movement
of animal spirits. Wonder, however, exhibits no such movement, while
each of the remaining primitives does. Though it may sound strange to
speak of animal spirits as the determining ground for passions, it is not
so far removed from our modern account of hormonal disposition.



The second and third primitives are those of [2] love and [3] hate. In the first
definition, love for something is simply the thought that this thing is
good [beneficent]; and hate, that it is harmful. Following these two is a
pair: [4] joy and [5] sadness. "Consideration of a present good arouses joy in us,
and consideration of a present evil arouses sadness, when the good or
evil is one that we regard as belonging to us."



The final primitive is [6] desire. Like wonder, desire has no opposite and is always directed towards the future. It disposes "the soul to wish, in
the future, for the things it represents to itself as agreeable." Desire
pertains not only to the want of good in the future, but also the "preservation" of good which exists in the present. Descartes does not pair aversion with desire on the primitive level. Aversion is simply the desire to
avoid evil and in this manner is reducible to desire itself. (Anthony F. Beavers, 'Desire and Love in Descartes's Late Philosophy', History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 279-294: 282-3.)




The emotions as a basis for collectivism



There is no reason why, given these primitive passions or emotions, collectivism should not be possible in some form. Co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation (Henry Tam, Communitarianism, London: Macmillan, 1998) could all be supported by the Cartesian passions. The exact mechanics by which collectivism could emerge from them is another matter.



The essential point is that once you have passions, you have the possibility not only of conflict and indifference but also of co-operation, which is the ground of collectivism. Appearances suggest that elements of co-operation, hence of collectivism, are real enough in contemporary life. In this sense 'collectivism actually exists'.






share|improve this answer























  • I think the problem is in the ambiguity of collectivism. Am I collectivist if I like my co-workers? Or only if I share all the profit with them?

    – mavavilj
    yesterday






  • 1





    I tried to disambiguate 'collectivism' by specifying the three elements of co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation. You introduce more specific elements connected with liking and sharing profits. There can be collectivism as I've defined it with or without these extras. I don't myself see that liking and profit-sharing are inherent conceptual elements of collectivism. They are contingent features - add-ons which are no part of the logic of the concept. You must make what you will of my answer. I have given the best I could.

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    yesterday












  • @GeoffreyThomas whilst.it''s not strictly necessary for members of a collective to.enjoy participation.. It's really the whole trick i think.

    – Richard
    yesterday












  • @Richard. Psychologically, you are dead right. So I've no desire to contest your point. I focused, narrowly I agree, on whether Cartesian subjects could make collectivist arrangements. I fixed on conceptual possibilities rather than psychological realities. All I'd say is that it's a contribution that users might want to consider. Best - Geoffrey

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    15 hours ago










Your Answer








StackExchange.ready(function()
var channelOptions =
tags: "".split(" "),
id: "265"
;
initTagRenderer("".split(" "), "".split(" "), channelOptions);

StackExchange.using("externalEditor", function()
// Have to fire editor after snippets, if snippets enabled
if (StackExchange.settings.snippets.snippetsEnabled)
StackExchange.using("snippets", function()
createEditor();
);

else
createEditor();

);

function createEditor()
StackExchange.prepareEditor(
heartbeatType: 'answer',
autoActivateHeartbeat: false,
convertImagesToLinks: false,
noModals: true,
showLowRepImageUploadWarning: true,
reputationToPostImages: null,
bindNavPrevention: true,
postfix: "",
imageUploader:
brandingHtml: "Powered by u003ca class="icon-imgur-white" href="https://imgur.com/"u003eu003c/au003e",
contentPolicyHtml: "User contributions licensed under u003ca href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/"u003ecc by-sa 3.0 with attribution requiredu003c/au003e u003ca href="https://stackoverflow.com/legal/content-policy"u003e(content policy)u003c/au003e",
allowUrls: true
,
noCode: true, onDemand: true,
discardSelector: ".discard-answer"
,immediatelyShowMarkdownHelp:true
);



);













draft saved

draft discarded


















StackExchange.ready(
function ()
StackExchange.openid.initPostLogin('.new-post-login', 'https%3a%2f%2fphilosophy.stackexchange.com%2fquestions%2f61326%2fdoes-collectivism-actually-exist%23new-answer', 'question_page');

);

Post as a guest















Required, but never shown

























1 Answer
1






active

oldest

votes








1 Answer
1






active

oldest

votes









active

oldest

votes






active

oldest

votes









4














Remembering the emotions



Descartes never says that we are merely cognitive beings. Thinking may be our essence - may define our essential nature - but we are also creatures of emotion or 'passion' as the term is usually rendered in translation.



In the Passions of the Soul he identifies six primitive passions :




The first primitive passion is [1] wonder, which occurs when an unfamiliar
object is encountered and which "we . . . find novel, or very different from
what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to be . . . ."
Wonder is first and foremost because it occurs before the object has been
determined to be "beneficial"; and it has no opposite, since looking at an
object without wonder is to look at it "without passion."



Descartes in fact defines each of the primitive passions through a differentiation which occurs on the biological level through the movement
of animal spirits. Wonder, however, exhibits no such movement, while
each of the remaining primitives does. Though it may sound strange to
speak of animal spirits as the determining ground for passions, it is not
so far removed from our modern account of hormonal disposition.



The second and third primitives are those of [2] love and [3] hate. In the first
definition, love for something is simply the thought that this thing is
good [beneficent]; and hate, that it is harmful. Following these two is a
pair: [4] joy and [5] sadness. "Consideration of a present good arouses joy in us,
and consideration of a present evil arouses sadness, when the good or
evil is one that we regard as belonging to us."



The final primitive is [6] desire. Like wonder, desire has no opposite and is always directed towards the future. It disposes "the soul to wish, in
the future, for the things it represents to itself as agreeable." Desire
pertains not only to the want of good in the future, but also the "preservation" of good which exists in the present. Descartes does not pair aversion with desire on the primitive level. Aversion is simply the desire to
avoid evil and in this manner is reducible to desire itself. (Anthony F. Beavers, 'Desire and Love in Descartes's Late Philosophy', History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 279-294: 282-3.)




The emotions as a basis for collectivism



There is no reason why, given these primitive passions or emotions, collectivism should not be possible in some form. Co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation (Henry Tam, Communitarianism, London: Macmillan, 1998) could all be supported by the Cartesian passions. The exact mechanics by which collectivism could emerge from them is another matter.



The essential point is that once you have passions, you have the possibility not only of conflict and indifference but also of co-operation, which is the ground of collectivism. Appearances suggest that elements of co-operation, hence of collectivism, are real enough in contemporary life. In this sense 'collectivism actually exists'.






share|improve this answer























  • I think the problem is in the ambiguity of collectivism. Am I collectivist if I like my co-workers? Or only if I share all the profit with them?

    – mavavilj
    yesterday






  • 1





    I tried to disambiguate 'collectivism' by specifying the three elements of co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation. You introduce more specific elements connected with liking and sharing profits. There can be collectivism as I've defined it with or without these extras. I don't myself see that liking and profit-sharing are inherent conceptual elements of collectivism. They are contingent features - add-ons which are no part of the logic of the concept. You must make what you will of my answer. I have given the best I could.

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    yesterday












  • @GeoffreyThomas whilst.it''s not strictly necessary for members of a collective to.enjoy participation.. It's really the whole trick i think.

    – Richard
    yesterday












  • @Richard. Psychologically, you are dead right. So I've no desire to contest your point. I focused, narrowly I agree, on whether Cartesian subjects could make collectivist arrangements. I fixed on conceptual possibilities rather than psychological realities. All I'd say is that it's a contribution that users might want to consider. Best - Geoffrey

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    15 hours ago















4














Remembering the emotions



Descartes never says that we are merely cognitive beings. Thinking may be our essence - may define our essential nature - but we are also creatures of emotion or 'passion' as the term is usually rendered in translation.



In the Passions of the Soul he identifies six primitive passions :




The first primitive passion is [1] wonder, which occurs when an unfamiliar
object is encountered and which "we . . . find novel, or very different from
what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to be . . . ."
Wonder is first and foremost because it occurs before the object has been
determined to be "beneficial"; and it has no opposite, since looking at an
object without wonder is to look at it "without passion."



Descartes in fact defines each of the primitive passions through a differentiation which occurs on the biological level through the movement
of animal spirits. Wonder, however, exhibits no such movement, while
each of the remaining primitives does. Though it may sound strange to
speak of animal spirits as the determining ground for passions, it is not
so far removed from our modern account of hormonal disposition.



The second and third primitives are those of [2] love and [3] hate. In the first
definition, love for something is simply the thought that this thing is
good [beneficent]; and hate, that it is harmful. Following these two is a
pair: [4] joy and [5] sadness. "Consideration of a present good arouses joy in us,
and consideration of a present evil arouses sadness, when the good or
evil is one that we regard as belonging to us."



The final primitive is [6] desire. Like wonder, desire has no opposite and is always directed towards the future. It disposes "the soul to wish, in
the future, for the things it represents to itself as agreeable." Desire
pertains not only to the want of good in the future, but also the "preservation" of good which exists in the present. Descartes does not pair aversion with desire on the primitive level. Aversion is simply the desire to
avoid evil and in this manner is reducible to desire itself. (Anthony F. Beavers, 'Desire and Love in Descartes's Late Philosophy', History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 279-294: 282-3.)




The emotions as a basis for collectivism



There is no reason why, given these primitive passions or emotions, collectivism should not be possible in some form. Co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation (Henry Tam, Communitarianism, London: Macmillan, 1998) could all be supported by the Cartesian passions. The exact mechanics by which collectivism could emerge from them is another matter.



The essential point is that once you have passions, you have the possibility not only of conflict and indifference but also of co-operation, which is the ground of collectivism. Appearances suggest that elements of co-operation, hence of collectivism, are real enough in contemporary life. In this sense 'collectivism actually exists'.






share|improve this answer























  • I think the problem is in the ambiguity of collectivism. Am I collectivist if I like my co-workers? Or only if I share all the profit with them?

    – mavavilj
    yesterday






  • 1





    I tried to disambiguate 'collectivism' by specifying the three elements of co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation. You introduce more specific elements connected with liking and sharing profits. There can be collectivism as I've defined it with or without these extras. I don't myself see that liking and profit-sharing are inherent conceptual elements of collectivism. They are contingent features - add-ons which are no part of the logic of the concept. You must make what you will of my answer. I have given the best I could.

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    yesterday












  • @GeoffreyThomas whilst.it''s not strictly necessary for members of a collective to.enjoy participation.. It's really the whole trick i think.

    – Richard
    yesterday












  • @Richard. Psychologically, you are dead right. So I've no desire to contest your point. I focused, narrowly I agree, on whether Cartesian subjects could make collectivist arrangements. I fixed on conceptual possibilities rather than psychological realities. All I'd say is that it's a contribution that users might want to consider. Best - Geoffrey

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    15 hours ago













4












4








4







Remembering the emotions



Descartes never says that we are merely cognitive beings. Thinking may be our essence - may define our essential nature - but we are also creatures of emotion or 'passion' as the term is usually rendered in translation.



In the Passions of the Soul he identifies six primitive passions :




The first primitive passion is [1] wonder, which occurs when an unfamiliar
object is encountered and which "we . . . find novel, or very different from
what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to be . . . ."
Wonder is first and foremost because it occurs before the object has been
determined to be "beneficial"; and it has no opposite, since looking at an
object without wonder is to look at it "without passion."



Descartes in fact defines each of the primitive passions through a differentiation which occurs on the biological level through the movement
of animal spirits. Wonder, however, exhibits no such movement, while
each of the remaining primitives does. Though it may sound strange to
speak of animal spirits as the determining ground for passions, it is not
so far removed from our modern account of hormonal disposition.



The second and third primitives are those of [2] love and [3] hate. In the first
definition, love for something is simply the thought that this thing is
good [beneficent]; and hate, that it is harmful. Following these two is a
pair: [4] joy and [5] sadness. "Consideration of a present good arouses joy in us,
and consideration of a present evil arouses sadness, when the good or
evil is one that we regard as belonging to us."



The final primitive is [6] desire. Like wonder, desire has no opposite and is always directed towards the future. It disposes "the soul to wish, in
the future, for the things it represents to itself as agreeable." Desire
pertains not only to the want of good in the future, but also the "preservation" of good which exists in the present. Descartes does not pair aversion with desire on the primitive level. Aversion is simply the desire to
avoid evil and in this manner is reducible to desire itself. (Anthony F. Beavers, 'Desire and Love in Descartes's Late Philosophy', History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 279-294: 282-3.)




The emotions as a basis for collectivism



There is no reason why, given these primitive passions or emotions, collectivism should not be possible in some form. Co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation (Henry Tam, Communitarianism, London: Macmillan, 1998) could all be supported by the Cartesian passions. The exact mechanics by which collectivism could emerge from them is another matter.



The essential point is that once you have passions, you have the possibility not only of conflict and indifference but also of co-operation, which is the ground of collectivism. Appearances suggest that elements of co-operation, hence of collectivism, are real enough in contemporary life. In this sense 'collectivism actually exists'.






share|improve this answer













Remembering the emotions



Descartes never says that we are merely cognitive beings. Thinking may be our essence - may define our essential nature - but we are also creatures of emotion or 'passion' as the term is usually rendered in translation.



In the Passions of the Soul he identifies six primitive passions :




The first primitive passion is [1] wonder, which occurs when an unfamiliar
object is encountered and which "we . . . find novel, or very different from
what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to be . . . ."
Wonder is first and foremost because it occurs before the object has been
determined to be "beneficial"; and it has no opposite, since looking at an
object without wonder is to look at it "without passion."



Descartes in fact defines each of the primitive passions through a differentiation which occurs on the biological level through the movement
of animal spirits. Wonder, however, exhibits no such movement, while
each of the remaining primitives does. Though it may sound strange to
speak of animal spirits as the determining ground for passions, it is not
so far removed from our modern account of hormonal disposition.



The second and third primitives are those of [2] love and [3] hate. In the first
definition, love for something is simply the thought that this thing is
good [beneficent]; and hate, that it is harmful. Following these two is a
pair: [4] joy and [5] sadness. "Consideration of a present good arouses joy in us,
and consideration of a present evil arouses sadness, when the good or
evil is one that we regard as belonging to us."



The final primitive is [6] desire. Like wonder, desire has no opposite and is always directed towards the future. It disposes "the soul to wish, in
the future, for the things it represents to itself as agreeable." Desire
pertains not only to the want of good in the future, but also the "preservation" of good which exists in the present. Descartes does not pair aversion with desire on the primitive level. Aversion is simply the desire to
avoid evil and in this manner is reducible to desire itself. (Anthony F. Beavers, 'Desire and Love in Descartes's Late Philosophy', History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 279-294: 282-3.)




The emotions as a basis for collectivism



There is no reason why, given these primitive passions or emotions, collectivism should not be possible in some form. Co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation (Henry Tam, Communitarianism, London: Macmillan, 1998) could all be supported by the Cartesian passions. The exact mechanics by which collectivism could emerge from them is another matter.



The essential point is that once you have passions, you have the possibility not only of conflict and indifference but also of co-operation, which is the ground of collectivism. Appearances suggest that elements of co-operation, hence of collectivism, are real enough in contemporary life. In this sense 'collectivism actually exists'.







share|improve this answer












share|improve this answer



share|improve this answer










answered yesterday









Geoffrey ThomasGeoffrey Thomas

27k221104




27k221104












  • I think the problem is in the ambiguity of collectivism. Am I collectivist if I like my co-workers? Or only if I share all the profit with them?

    – mavavilj
    yesterday






  • 1





    I tried to disambiguate 'collectivism' by specifying the three elements of co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation. You introduce more specific elements connected with liking and sharing profits. There can be collectivism as I've defined it with or without these extras. I don't myself see that liking and profit-sharing are inherent conceptual elements of collectivism. They are contingent features - add-ons which are no part of the logic of the concept. You must make what you will of my answer. I have given the best I could.

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    yesterday












  • @GeoffreyThomas whilst.it''s not strictly necessary for members of a collective to.enjoy participation.. It's really the whole trick i think.

    – Richard
    yesterday












  • @Richard. Psychologically, you are dead right. So I've no desire to contest your point. I focused, narrowly I agree, on whether Cartesian subjects could make collectivist arrangements. I fixed on conceptual possibilities rather than psychological realities. All I'd say is that it's a contribution that users might want to consider. Best - Geoffrey

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    15 hours ago

















  • I think the problem is in the ambiguity of collectivism. Am I collectivist if I like my co-workers? Or only if I share all the profit with them?

    – mavavilj
    yesterday






  • 1





    I tried to disambiguate 'collectivism' by specifying the three elements of co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation. You introduce more specific elements connected with liking and sharing profits. There can be collectivism as I've defined it with or without these extras. I don't myself see that liking and profit-sharing are inherent conceptual elements of collectivism. They are contingent features - add-ons which are no part of the logic of the concept. You must make what you will of my answer. I have given the best I could.

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    yesterday












  • @GeoffreyThomas whilst.it''s not strictly necessary for members of a collective to.enjoy participation.. It's really the whole trick i think.

    – Richard
    yesterday












  • @Richard. Psychologically, you are dead right. So I've no desire to contest your point. I focused, narrowly I agree, on whether Cartesian subjects could make collectivist arrangements. I fixed on conceptual possibilities rather than psychological realities. All I'd say is that it's a contribution that users might want to consider. Best - Geoffrey

    – Geoffrey Thomas
    15 hours ago
















I think the problem is in the ambiguity of collectivism. Am I collectivist if I like my co-workers? Or only if I share all the profit with them?

– mavavilj
yesterday





I think the problem is in the ambiguity of collectivism. Am I collectivist if I like my co-workers? Or only if I share all the profit with them?

– mavavilj
yesterday




1




1





I tried to disambiguate 'collectivism' by specifying the three elements of co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation. You introduce more specific elements connected with liking and sharing profits. There can be collectivism as I've defined it with or without these extras. I don't myself see that liking and profit-sharing are inherent conceptual elements of collectivism. They are contingent features - add-ons which are no part of the logic of the concept. You must make what you will of my answer. I have given the best I could.

– Geoffrey Thomas
yesterday






I tried to disambiguate 'collectivism' by specifying the three elements of co-operative inquiry, mutual responsibility, and citizen participation. You introduce more specific elements connected with liking and sharing profits. There can be collectivism as I've defined it with or without these extras. I don't myself see that liking and profit-sharing are inherent conceptual elements of collectivism. They are contingent features - add-ons which are no part of the logic of the concept. You must make what you will of my answer. I have given the best I could.

– Geoffrey Thomas
yesterday














@GeoffreyThomas whilst.it''s not strictly necessary for members of a collective to.enjoy participation.. It's really the whole trick i think.

– Richard
yesterday






@GeoffreyThomas whilst.it''s not strictly necessary for members of a collective to.enjoy participation.. It's really the whole trick i think.

– Richard
yesterday














@Richard. Psychologically, you are dead right. So I've no desire to contest your point. I focused, narrowly I agree, on whether Cartesian subjects could make collectivist arrangements. I fixed on conceptual possibilities rather than psychological realities. All I'd say is that it's a contribution that users might want to consider. Best - Geoffrey

– Geoffrey Thomas
15 hours ago





@Richard. Psychologically, you are dead right. So I've no desire to contest your point. I focused, narrowly I agree, on whether Cartesian subjects could make collectivist arrangements. I fixed on conceptual possibilities rather than psychological realities. All I'd say is that it's a contribution that users might want to consider. Best - Geoffrey

– Geoffrey Thomas
15 hours ago

















draft saved

draft discarded
















































Thanks for contributing an answer to Philosophy Stack Exchange!


  • Please be sure to answer the question. Provide details and share your research!

But avoid


  • Asking for help, clarification, or responding to other answers.

  • Making statements based on opinion; back them up with references or personal experience.

To learn more, see our tips on writing great answers.




draft saved


draft discarded














StackExchange.ready(
function ()
StackExchange.openid.initPostLogin('.new-post-login', 'https%3a%2f%2fphilosophy.stackexchange.com%2fquestions%2f61326%2fdoes-collectivism-actually-exist%23new-answer', 'question_page');

);

Post as a guest















Required, but never shown





















































Required, but never shown














Required, but never shown












Required, but never shown







Required, but never shown

































Required, but never shown














Required, but never shown












Required, but never shown







Required, but never shown







Popular posts from this blog

Sum ergo cogito? 1 nng

三茅街道4182Guuntc Dn precexpngmageondP